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RING AROUND THE COLLAR-CHAIN AROUND
HER NECK: A PROPOSAL TO MONITOR SEX
ROLE STEREOTYPING IN TELEVISION
ADVERTISING
Women are still conceived in television and radio as being
creatures of consumption who run around squeezing toilet
paper and worrying about the shine of their floors and the
taste of their coffee.'
It is widely recognized that television has an enormous effect on
American life. As one court has noted:
The technological and cultural changes connected to the current
preeminence of the broadcast media as our primary means of com-
munication. . are. striking. The soap box orator and the
leafleter are becoming almost obsolescent; their Saturday afternoon
audiences have increasingly moved indoors-in front of their tele-
vision sets.2
The pervasiveness of television in the United States cannot be overstated.
Census data reveal that 96 percent of American homes have at least one
television set. The average set is on more than six hours a day. Most
adults and children report watching television at least two hours daily,
indicating that television viewing is a daily experience.'
Similarly, the product advertising which permeates all commercial
television broadcasting wields enormous influence. The effectiveness of
the television commercial is not disputed. It alone appeals to our most
receptive senses, sight and hearing. Memory experiments indicate
strongly that people tend to remember advertising presented by a com-
bined visual and auditory method significantly more than advertising
directed at sight or sound alone.4 Selling by television thus enjoys
1. Address by Congresswoman Bella Abzug, State University of New York at
Buffalo, Oct. 18, 1975.
2. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 653
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
3. SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY CoIm. ON TELEVISION AND SOCIAL
BEAviOR, U.S. Puic HEALTH SERVIcE, TE VISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF
TELEVSED VIOLENCE 2 (1972).
4. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101 n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 842 (1969). See generally V. PACKARD, Tim HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957). Esti-
mates are that, by the time of high school graduation, the average student has viewed
approximately 100,000 television commercials, a "relentless input of visual data." L.
DIANANT, TELEVISION'S CLASSIC COMNMRCIALS 1 (1971). See also Silverstein & Silver-
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certain obvious advantages over other forms of media advertising. The
television message is received instantaneously in a unique audio-visual
package and requires from the viewer none of the concentration neces-
sary with other types of media.5 In addition, the structure of television
programming is such that televised advertising messages have become
virtually inescapable. 6
Concern over the power of television has prompted the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), Congress, and the courts either to
regulate or to prohibit certain types of television advertising.' Recently,
concern has been expressed over the impact of television advertising
aimed at childrens and the effect of product advertisements which
continue to portray women in a limited number of stereotyped roles.9 It
is to the latter problem, the image of women in television product ad-
vertising, that this note is directed.
stein, The Portrayal of Women in Television Advertising, 27 FEE. COM. B.J. 71, 73
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Silverstein & Silverstein]. The demand for access to this
captivating medium is so great that currently the major television networks are able to
command up to $80,000 per minute for nationwide, prime time advertising. T. GREEN,
THE UNIVERSAL EYE: THE WORLD OF TELEVISION 23 (1972). Recent figures indicate
that advertisers spend in excess of $4.5 billion per year for the privilege of trying to
influence American spending habits through televised advertising. 44 TELEVISION
FACTBOOK 62-a (Services Vol. 1974-75).
5. "Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and reading
requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are 'in the air.'" Banzhaf
v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
6. "In an age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who does not
know some part of a leading jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual television
watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently leaving the room, changing the
channel, or doing some other such affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the
subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened
to, but it may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written word." Id. at
1100-01; accord, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127-28 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, petition for reconsideration denied, 9
F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub non. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, § 6, 15
U.S.C. § 1335 (Supp. IV, 1974).
8. See Action for Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Embree, Media Images 1: Madison Avenue Brainwashing-The
Facts, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 175-91 (R. Morgan ed. 1970); NATIONAL
ADVERTISING REVIEW BOARD, ADVERTISING AND WOMEN (1975); Dominick & Rauch, The
Image of Women in Network TV Commercials, 16 J. BROADCASTING 259 (1972);
Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 4, at 71; Bird, What's Television Doing for 50.4% of
Americans?, TV GUIDE, Feb. 27, 1971, at 5; Grant, Women's Libs Fume at Insulting
Ads: Ad Gals Unruffled, ADVERTISING AGE, June 27, 1970, at 1; Hennessee & Nicholson,
NOW Says: TV Commercials Insult Women, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 12; Proctor and Gamble Holders Say TV Ads Are Unfair to .Women, Wall St.
Journal, Sept. 15, 1975, at 24, col. 2.
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SEX ROLE STEREOTYPING
It has been suggested that women are portrayed in the media in
demeaning and subservient roles similar to the media roles assigned in
the past to blacks.10 In the words of one United Nations report:
[Tihe image of women in the family portrayed by advertisements
reinforces sex role stereotypes. It is acceptable for women to do
the mending, washing and feeding, and men to do handiwork or
wash the car. Women are usually portrayed as unable to think
for themselves and they invariably let the men make the decisions.
Seldom are they shown ever making decisions on the higher-priced
purchases. Loss of masculine approval is viewed as a threat, and
a woman's actions or clever uses of the product are viewed so as
to gain the man's approval and securely entrench the women's
place in his life. . . . According to advertisements, women seem
to be obsessed with cleanliness, placing above-normal emphasis on
whiteness, brightness and expressing a gamut of emotions at smell-
ing the kitchen floor or the family wash. .... 11
Although stereotyping of women has been reduced somewhat in tele-
vised entertainment programming,'12 women in television product adver-
tising are still portrayed as subservient to and dependent on their male
companions as well as abnormally preoccupied with the cleanliness of
their special "domain," the home:
Turn on your television set, any time of day or night, and you don't
have to wait long to see a woman carefully being kept in her place.
Her place, of course, is primarily the home. More specifically, it
seems her place is in the kitchen and the bathroom. Occasionally
she walks through her living room with a spray can to clear the
air of cigar odors. . or to polish a table with one hand tied be-
hind her.13
10. M. Butler-Paisley & W. Paisley-Butler, Sexism in the Media: Frameworks for
Research, pt. 1, at 1, Oct. 1974 (unpublished manuscript on file at Applied Communica-
tion Research, Palo Alto, California) [hereinafter cited as Butler-Paisley & Paisley-
Butler].
11. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN OF Tm UNiTED NATIONS EcoNoMIc
AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, INFLUENCE OF MASS COMMUNICATION MEDIA ON THE FORMATION
OF A NEW ATrTuDE TOwARDs THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN PRESENT-DAY SOCIETY: REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL 15 (1974). Women are also portrayed as having little in
the way of intelligence or individuality. See Butler-Paisley & Paisley-Butler, supra note
10, pt. 2, at 1.
12. See Berman, Prime Time (Almost) Comes of Age With . . . "Phyllis" and
"Fay," Ms. MAGAZIN, Nov., 1975, at 61-62; Phillips, Prime Time Comes of Age With
... Anne Meara as Kate McShane, Ms. MAGAZINE, Nov. 1975, at 62-65.
13. Butler-Paisley & Paisley-Butler, supra note 10, pt. 7, at 11. Recent studies
have demonstrated statistically that the image of women in television commercials
continues to be that of inferior creatures who are unable to concern themselves with
much of anything beyond the confines of the kitchen or nursery. See, e.g. Courtney &
Whipple, Women in TV Commercials, 24 J. COMMUNICATION 110 (1974); Dominick &
Rauch, The Image of Women in Network TV Commericals, 16 J. BROADCASTING 259
(1972); Schumann, Portrait of American Men and Women in TV Commercials, 4
PSYCHOLOGY, Nov., 1967 at 18-23; Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 4, at 71.
Four commentators have divided the images of women in television commercials
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Two observations suggest that television's portrayal of women in
stereotypical social roles is a matter of concern. First, even though
presentation of these stereotypes in commercial messages may be sec-
ondary to the product sales pitches involved, such treatment significantly
affects the attitudes of the American public toward women. According
to two commentators," since an advertisement is designed to serve as a
model for consumer selection, there is a tendency for the entire setting of
the commercial, including incidental role portrayals, to be viewed as
part of the model. Therefore, "it can be safely said that regardless of
the theory to which one subscribes, improper depiction of women in
television commercials will have ill effects in the form of formulating or
perpetuating misconceptions or stereotypes."' 5
into five "consciousness levels" which provide an illuminating standard of reference for
analysis of the problem: Consciousness Level I-Women are portrayed as pure sex
objects (as in cosmetic advertisements, etc.); Consciousness Level 11-Women are
portrayed in the traditional, acceptable roles of wife, mother, and housekeeper; Con-
sciousness Level III-Women are shown as able to have professional careers as long as
they continue to fulfill the traditional roles described in Consciousness Level II;
Consciousness Level IV-Women are emphasized as being fully equal to or superior to
men; Consciousness Level V-Non stereotypic level: men and women are viewed as
individuals, superior to one another in some respects and inferior in others. S. Pingree,
R. Hawkins, M. Butler-Paisley & W. Paisley-Butler, Keeping Her in Her Place: A
Consciousness Scale for Media Sexism (article scheduled to be published in the Journal
of Communication in Summer, 1976). See also Butler-Paisley & Paisley-Butler, supra
note 10, pt. 7, at 1-29.
As might be expected, few commercials ever reach Level V. In fact, according to
the commentators, most commercials are clustered at Levels II and III. Id.
14. Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 4, at 71, 74-75.
15. Id. at 75. Various theories have been advanced to explain the effects of
television and television advertising on people's processes of socialization. One theory
holds that television and television advertisements have a "status-inferral" effect which
imposes upon individuals or groups whatever status has been assigned to them by
repetitive media coverage. According to this theory, stereotypes of women in television
commercials would further the tendency to restrict the social roles available to women by
convincing the viewing audience that, for example, a woman's place is in the home.
Lazarsfeld & Merton, Mass Communication, Popular Taste, and Organized Social Action,
in BRYSON, THE COMMUNICATION OF IDEAS (1948).
Another theorist has stated, "Mass media . . . consist of various layers of meaning
superimposed on one another . . . . As a matter of fact, the hidden message may be
more important than the overt since this hidden message will escape the controls of
consciousness, will not be 'looked through'; will not be warded off by sales resistance, but
is likely to sink into the spectator's mind." Adorno, How to Look at Television, 8 Q.
FrM, RADio & T.V. 213 (1954). According to this "sleeper effect" theory, "viewers let
down their guard when confronted with repetitive commercials and they assume they will
not be fazed by it, yet at some future time they in fact unconsciously act on the basis of
what they [have] seen." Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 4, at 74. See also Krugman
& Hartley, Passive Learning From Television, 34 PuR. OPIN. Q. 184 (1970); Krugman,
The Impact of Television Advertising: Learning Without Involvement, 29 PUB. OPIN. Q.
349, 354 (1965). Presumably, under this theory, if television viewers are exposed to a
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The second observation is that continued stereotyping of women in
television commercials causes and contributes to sex discrimination,"0
and is thus contrary to the public interest. It is the thesis of this note
that the FCC, as the agency charged with supervision of the public
airwaves, should therefore make fair and equitable treatment of women
in television product advertising a component of each broadcast licen-
see's public interest obligation.17  It will be proposed that upon receipt
of a citizen complaint, the FCC should include an evaluation of the
treatment of women in product advertising in its periodic determination
of whether or not to renew a broadcast license.
This thesis will be developed in four steps. First, discussion will
focus on the legal basis for regulating commercial advertising.18 Sec-
ond, the role of the FCC in supervising the use of the airwaves will be
considered with a view toward establishing the commission's public
interest obligation to balance the treatment of women in television
product advertising.' 9 The basis for this obligation will be traced to
judicial and legislative articulations of national policy against both sex
steady diet of commercials in which women are stereotyped in subservient roles, those
viewers will unconsciously act on the basis of the stereotypes in their daily lives.
Still another theory is that, in the absence of personal relationships, television acts
as a substitute companion. 'The persuasive power that television wields over the viewer
thus becomes as influential as an intimate friend would be." Silverstein & Silverstein,
supra note 4, at 73, citing Chaney, Television Dependency and Family Relationships
Amongst Juvenile Delinquents in the United Kingdom, 18 Soc. REv. 103 (1970).
16. "Discrimination is the process of forming stereotyped views that all members
of a particular group are assumed to possess the characteristics of the group." Blau,
"Women's Place" in the Labor Market, 62 AM. ECON. Rv., May 1972, at 161, 164. See
also The Sex Stereotypes That Make Sex Discrimination Acceptable, in B. BABCOCK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 208-13 (1975).
17. A possible rebuttal to this contention is that since there is really no readily
demonstrable connection between images of women in television advertisements and
discrimination on the basis of sex, any attempt by the federal government to regulate the
former would be a denial of due process. A similar argument was made by the appellant
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973). Pittsburgh Press argued that no connection could be shown between sex
designated column headings in their help-wanted advertising and sex discrimination in
employment. The Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, stating that, given
the evidence in the record, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations could easily
have reached a common sense recognition that the advertised job classifications and
discrimination in employment were connected. Id. at 381 n.7. See also Hailes v. United
Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1972); EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.1-.10 (1975). In light of these holdings, it is
submitted that the evidence already referred to in this note supports the common sense
conclusion that the images of women in advertisements result in sex discrimination by
molding, reinforcing, and encouraging those attitudes which motivate discriminatory and
inferior treatment of women. See notes 1-15 & accompanying text supra.
18. See text accompanying notes 23-72 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 86-128 infra.
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role stereotyping and sex discrimination.2 ° The third step will involve
analysis of the character of a possible regulatory scheme with emphasis
on the goals of balancing the image of women in television advertising
and promoting citizen participation in the regulatory process. 21 Finally,
a proposed regulation will be outlined in some detail in order to provide
a concrete basis for action. 22
The Legal Basis for Monitoring Television Advertising
There is no question that the FCC is charged with regulating the
broadcast airwaves in the public interest.2 3 Nevertheless, if the FCC is
to use the extent of nondiscriminatory treatment of women in television
product advertising as one measure of a licensee's public interest per-
formance, a satisfactory response must be made to the argument that
such regulation is a direct infringement of rights guaranteed by the first
amendment to the Constitution. The issue has been framed by the
United States Supreme Court as follows:
The question . . . is simply whether the [Federal Communica-
tions] Commission, by announcing that it will refuse licenses to
persons who engage in specified network practices . . . is thereby
denying such persons the constitutional right of free speech.2 4
Television is significantly involved in interstate commerce,25 and
Congress can remove from such commerce activities or products consid-
ered harmful to the public welfare.' Nevertheless, the ability of the
FCC to monitor sex role stereotyping in television product advertising
cannot be established simply by quoting from the commerce clause of
the Constitution. Under the first amendment, advertisers are entitled to
express their viewpoints and to enter freely the marketplace of the
electronic media. Broadcasters, in turn, are free to exercise their edito-
rial discretion in structuring the content of their programming. In the
past, a qualification of the first amendment, known as the commer-
cial speech doctrine, permitted more extensive regulation of advertis-
ing than of other public speech protected by the Constitution. How-
ever, a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court has extended
20. See text accompanying notes 129-46 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 151-87 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 188-99 infra.
23. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1970).
24. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
25. "There is no doubt but that television broadcasting is in interstate commerce.
This is inherent in its very nature." Allen B.-Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d
153, 154 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951); accord, NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 144-45 n.6 (1973); Champion
v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 354-62 (1903).
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the protection of the first amendment to commercial advertising.
7
Nevertheless, it will be submitted that the special characteristics of the
electronic media, the important national interest in ending sex dis-
crimination, and the FCC's responsibility to serve that interest impose
upon broadcast licensees an obligation to eliminate sex role stereotyping
in television product advertising.
Commercial Speech
Until this year, the commercial speech doctrine distinguished prod-
uct advertising from other forms of speech, giving the former less com-
plete protection under the first amendment. Since the doctrine was first
enunciated in the 1940's,28 it has evolved from what one Supreme Court
justice characterized as a "casual, almost offhand" ruling 9 into a widely
used constitutional theory30 which, in a more recent form, required a ju-
dicial balancing of conflicting interests in free expression and effective
government regulations. 1  Although advertising per se was not stripped
of all first amendment protection,-2 the degree of protection was to be
determined by weighing the quality of the advertising against the im-
portance of the governmental interest in regulation. 3
When pure product advertising, as opposed to editorial or other
informational advertising, was weighed in the old commercial speech
balance described above, reasonable government regulation was gener-
ally sustained by the courts. 4 The decision to deny product advertising
27. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
28. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
29. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
30. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 842 (1969); Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585 (D.C.D.C.
1971) (3 judge ct.), affd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405
U.S. 1000 (1972). See also Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78
HARv. L. REv. 1191, 1194-1203 (1965); Amnot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1124 (1974). For FCC
acceptance of the doctrine see Evening News Ass'n, 49 F.C.C.2d 380, 386 (1974);
Kaiser Broadcasting Co., 45 F.C.C.2d 344, 347 (1974).
31. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85, 389 (1973); Terry v.
California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 101-04 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (3 judge
ct.), affd mem., 44 U.S.L.W. 3698 (1976); Unemployed Workers Union v. Hackett,
332 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (D.R.I. 1971); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't., 300
F. Supp. 1036, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (3 judge ct.), aff'd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
32. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1973); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
33. See note 31 supra.
34. See cases cited note 30 supra.
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a full measure of first amendment protection reflected a judicial con-
sensus on the scope of the first amendment and the nature of product
advertising. A frequently cited passage from the opinion in Banzhaf v.
FCC,3  the landmark ruling concerning cigarette advertising, provides
a clear summary of this viewpoint:
It is established that some utterances fall outside the pale of First
Amendment concern. Many cases indicate that product advertis-
ing is at least less rigorously protected than other forms of speech.
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with
any of the interests the First Amendment seeks to protect. As a
rule, it does not affect the political process, does not contribute
to the exchange of ideas, does not provide information on matters
of public importance, and is not, except perhaps for the ad-men,
a form of individual self-expression. It is rather a form of mer-
chandising subject to limitation for public purposes like other busi-
ness practices.
Thus, under the terms of the old commercial speech doctrine, if the
aim of an advertisement was product sales, and if the advertisement was
devoid of useful news, ideas, or information other than that which
concerned the product itself, reasonable government regulation could be
properly imposed.36
A Problem of Interpretation
Although the commercial speech doctrine would have been appeal-
ing to one seeking the reform of television advertising, the rationale be-
hind the doctrine cut two ways. As stated above, the reason given for
less rigorously guarding the first amendment rights of commercial speak-
ers was that "the use of speech to sell products . .. bears little, if any,
relation to the discussion of . . . subjects which the Supreme Court
believes the first amendment was historically designed to protect.''aT On
one hand, this reasoning could have been interpreted to mean that the
full range of television product advertising falls within the scope of gov-
ernment regulation. On the other hand, this same reasoning seemed to
denigrate the value of commercial speech, implying that advertising de-
served less than full first amendment protection simply because it was
not really worth that much protection.
35. 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
See also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191.
36. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818-22, 826 (1975); Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85, 389 (1973). See
note 30 supra.
37. Holiday Magic Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20, 25 (E.D. Wis. 1973), vacated
on other grounds, 497 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1974).
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The latter attitude was reflected in Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations,3" in which the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the commercial speech doctrine in upholding a prohibition of sex
based distinctions in the help wanted columns of a newspaper's classi-
fied advertising section. Although the opinion stressed the inherent
illegality of such an advertising scheme,39 the Court suggested that the
commercial standard could also justify regulation of Pittsburgh Press,
because "[i]n the crucial respects, the advertisements in the present
record resemble the [Valentine v.] Chrestensen rather than the [New
York Times v.] Sullivan advertisement [which had been accorded full
first amendment protection because of its editorial content]. . . . Each
is no more than a proposal of possible employment. The advertise-
ments are thus classic examples of commercial speech."4
Because analyses of commercial speech such as the one noted in
Pittsburgh Press suggested that commercial speech was an inferior vari-
ety of speech, the old commercial speech doctrine was susceptible of
conflicting interpretations. The hawking of thousands of commercial
products over the television airwaves is undoubtedly "classic" commer-
cial speech and was therefore arguably subject to stricter control than
other speech protected by the first amendment. Controversial posi-
tions are not advocated or opposed in such advertising, there is no
wealth of creative self-expression to be protected, and the free flow
of ideas is not significantly enhanced. By the same token, though,
the implication of the old commercial speech doctrine that advertis-
ing was inferior to other forms of speech seemed to undercut the
urgency of concern over the impact of television commercials on such
issues as the progress of women's equality. In short, if commercial
speech was of such low first amendment value as not to be worthy of full
protection, why all the fuss? This latter view of commercial speech,
which had a certain amount of logical appeal, is significant because it
appears to be the basis for the FCC's present hands-off position on the
regulation of television advertising.41 As will be demonstrated, how-
ever, this view fails to account for the impact which a television product
commercial can actually have.
The FCC's Current Attitude
In a July, 1974 opinion known as the Fairness Report,42 the FCC
38. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
39. Id. at 388-89.
40. Id. at 385.
41. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 24-25 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Fairness Report].
42. 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
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announced a virtual abandonment of its previously active role in the
regulation of television advertising. Although its comments were nomi-
nally directed at defining the scope of the fairness doctrine,4 3 the
commission made a sweeping reevaluation of the impact of television
advertising on the American public. Seven years earlier, concern over
that impact had prompted the FCC to conclude that because a recog-
nized public health hazard was involved, broadcasters must provide a
reasonable opportunity for response to be made to the message of
televised cigarette advertisements.44  At the time of this original ciga-
rette ruling, cigarette advertisers had made an argument similar to that
used to justify the commercial speech doctrine, urging that cigarette
commercials did not express an actual opinion and that "in the absence
of an affirmative discussion of the health issue, [the commercials] could
not realistically be viewed as part of a public debate."45  The FCC
rejected this argument, choosing instead to recognize the impact of
television advertisements and to view the question in terms of whether or
not cigarette advertising conveyed the desirability of smoking. The
FCC later summarized this position in its reevaluation of the decision:
With the issue defined in this fashion, it was a simple mechanical
procedure to "trigger" the fairness doctrine and treat all cigarette
advertisements-regardless of what they actually said-as being
presentations on one side of a controversial issue [thus requiring
the broadcaster to provide a reasonable opportunity for airing of
opposing viewpoints]. It seemed to be clear enough that all
cigarette advertisements suggested that the use of the product was
desirable. 46
In its recent reconsideration of this analysis, however, the FCC
modified its position and adopted a standard emphasizing the idea of the
lesser value of advertising implicit in the traditional view of commercial
speech. The commission stated:
We believe that standard product commercials, such as the old cig-
arette ads, make no meaningful contribution toward informing the
public on any side of any issue.47
Thus, concluded the commission, "it seems . . . to make little practical
sense to view advertisements such as these as presenting a meaningful
discussion of a controversial issue of public importance.48
43. See text accompanying notes 151-54 infra for discussion of the fairness
doctrine as it relates to the regulatory scheme proposed in this article.
44. Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, petition for reconsideration
denied, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
45. Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 24.
46. Id.
47. Id., citing Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 25. See also Action for Children's Television, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 39 n.2
(1974).
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Unfortunately, the same type of argument has also appeared in
recent FCC decisions on the subject of sex role stereotypes in program-
ming and advertising. In 1975, the National Organization for Women
(NOW) challenged the license renewals of two television stations, one
owned and operated by the National Broadcasting Company and the
other owned by the American Broadcasting Company, on grounds of
generally unfair treatment of women in both programming and advertis-
ing.4" Among other arguments, NOW contended that the fairness
doctrine was triggered by "programming contain[ing] messages which,
by implication, contribute to some discussion of the controversial issue
of women's role in society."50 In its decision, however, the commission
rejected the idea that mere images conveyed by programs or commer-
cials could raise significant issues worthy of regulation. Citing the
Fairness Report,51 the commission concluded that the fairness doctrine
could be triggered only by actual discussion of a controversial issue and
that implicit messages or images in programs and commercials were not
proper subjects of regulation. 52  The commission found that the licen-
sees' "entertainment programming and commercial matter bear only a
'tenuous relationship' to the role of women in society." 53 Moreover, the
commission explained, "petitioners' catalogue of women's roles por-
trayed. . . is just too insubstantial for us to determine that an implicit
message is contained in the manner in which the listed roles were
presented, or that the roles were demonstrably linked to a controversial
issue of public importance." 54
It is submitted that this analysis of television advertising not only
abdicates responsibility for the FCC's regulatory duties but also fails to
account for the importance which television advertising has been given
by the courts5  and the impact of television commercials on the viewing
public. Television advertising does communicate powerful, repetitive
messages concerning the ways and means of consumption in Amer-
ica. 6 The impact of a constantly repeated, attractively designed, audio-
visual message is enormous, regardless of its level of intellectual so-
phistication. 57  The goal of a television commercial need not be edu-
49. ABC, 52 F.C.C.2d 98 (1975); NBC, 52 F.C.C.2d 273 (1975).
50. ABC, 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 115 (1975).
51. 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 13 (1974).
52. ABC, 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 115 (1975).
53. Id. at 116.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Larus
& Bro. Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Capital Broadcasting v. Mitchell,
333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C.D.C. 1971) (3 judge ct.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 100 (1972).
56. See text accompanying notes 1-17 supra & 57-59, 157, 205, infra.
57. "Some percepts are subject to more exposures or 'trials' than others .... In
eptember 1976]
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cational in order to make a strong point. In its evaluation of the
fairness doctrine's applicability to televised automobile commercials,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed
that a television commercial often carries a powerful message by
implication alone. The court stated that, "commercials which contin-
ue to insinuate that the human personality finds greater fulfillment in
the large car with the quick getaway do, it seems to us, ventilate a point
of view . . . ."" The lingering effects of a television advertisement
can influence buying habits, change ways of thinking, and, at least in
part, mold people's images of American life.0 9
The above discussion suggests that if advertising can still be regu-
lated without fear of compromising the first amendment protection now
given to commercial speech,60 it is incorrect to justify this conclusion
on the ground that commercial speech is essentially ineffectual speech.
To do so is to obviate the necessity for regulation. In fact, commer-
cial speech such as television advertising should be an important sub-
ject for scrutiny by the FCC in light of that agency's responsibility to
safeguard the public's interest in the airwaves.
The influence which television advertising can have was recognized
in Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell.6 In that case, a three-judge
general, the more exposures . . . the more learning." Butler-Paisley & Paisley-Butler,
supra note 10, pt. 2 at 8-9.
58. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Significantly, the FCC itself has acknowledged the impact which "implied" or "implicit"
messages can have. In one case, the commission put radio broadcasters on notice that,
henceforth, musical programming should be monitored to guard against the subtle impact
which drug-oriented music could have on the listening audience, especially young people.
Licensee Reponsibility To Review Records Before Their Broadcast, 28 F.C.C.2d 409
(1971). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals agreed that the FCC properly
exercised its power to remind broadcast licensees that they could not remain indifferent
to the impact which drug-oriented music might have. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 478
F.2d 594, 596-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Presumably, similar recognition by the FCC of the
subtle impact which stereotypes of women in television commercials can have on the
viewing audience should prompt a similar response.
59. Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which has long been in-
volved in regulating television advertising, reached an analagous conclusion. In an
opinion concerning the validity of Warner Lambert's television advertisements for the
mouthwash Listerine, the commission recognized that the effects of television advertising
are cumulative, lingering on in viewers' minds to create lasting images which influence
buying decisions. When found to be false and misleading, concluded the commission.
these images must be counteracted with corrective advertising campaigns similar in
magnitude to the efforts which created the erroneous images. Warner-Lambert Co.,
CCH, TRADE REG. REP. % 21,066, at 20,937 (F.T.C. 1975).
60. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
61. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C.D.C. 1971) (3 judge ct.), af'd mem. sub nom.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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district court considered the constitutionality of that section of the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 which prohibits cigarette
advertising in the electronic media. 62  The plaintiff had argued that
since cigarette commercials, by implication, state a position on a matter
of public importance, the first amendment should provide protection
against enforcement of the law banning such advertisements from the
electronic media. 3 In its response, the court adhered to the traditional
view that there is a carefully drawn distinction "between first amend-
ment protections as such, and the rather limited extent to which product
advertising is tangentially regarded as having some limited indicia of
such protection."6 4 The court held that the fact that cigarette advertis-
ing was subject to the FCC's fairness doctrine65 did not necessarily
qualify such advertising for full first amendment protection in light of
the prior case law concerning commercial speech.66
Although this opinion paralleled previous federal court decisions in
recognizing the inferior position of commercial speech under the first
amendment, the court in Capital Broadcasting expressed concern over
the significant impact of the television advertising message. That con-
cern was articulated in response to plaintiff's argument that special
regulation of television advertising, as opposed to other forms of media,
amounted to invidious discrimination in violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution. 67  The court replied
that the due process challenge would fail if a reasonable basis could be
found for singling out television advertising for special regulatory treat-
ment.' Despite the lesser value of advertising which can be inferred
from the degree of regulation permitted under the commercial speech
doctrine, 9 the court found the necessary basis in factors which included
the pervasiveness of advertising by radio and television.70  The court
took particular notice of the congressional concern over the influence
which television advertisements can have on children:
Congress knew of the close relationship between cigarette commer-
cials broadcast on the electronic media and their potential influence
on young people, and was no doubt aware that the younger the
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974). This law was enacted subsequent
to the FCC's fairness doctrine rulings on cigarette advertising, discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 42-48 supra.
63. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
64. Id. at 585.
65. See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra & 151-54 infra for further discussion
of the fairness doctrine.
66. 333 F. Supp. at 585. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
67. 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
68. Id.
69. See text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
70. 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
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individual, the greater the reliance on the broadcast message rather
than the written word.71
Anticipating that future applications of the commercial speech doctrine
would involve a formal balancing of interests, the court in Capital
Broadcasting did not hesitate to conclude that when as powerful a
commercial message as the television advertisement comes into conflict
with an important public policy, in this case public health, it deserves
careful analysis and, when necessary, regulation. 72
In May of 1976, the first amendment's protection was extended
to commercial speech by the United States Supreme Court in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.73 By virtue of that decision, commercial advertising now enjoys
virtually the same first amendment protection as other, noncommercial
forms of expression. Thus, the viability of a proposal to regulate sex
role stereotyping in television advertising must be reevaluated in light
of the new freedom of commercial speech. Even though regulation of
television product advertising may be desirable because, as noted above,
it has a tremendous influence on attitudes and beliefs, the Virginia
Citizens Consumer case raises a serious question whether, and under
what circumstances, such advertising can be regulated without abridging
the first amendment.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 74
On May 24, 1976, the Supreme Court held that a Virginia statute
prohibiting advertising of drug price information violated the first
amendment rights of consumers to receive and of pharmacists to dis-
seminate that type of information.75
In reaching its decision, the Court squarely confronted the issue of
"whether speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial trans-
action,' " lacks all first amendment protection.76 The Court, for the
first time, declared that the fact that an advertiser's interest in selling
his wares may be purely economic does not make that advertiser's
speech less worthy of first amendment protection than other forms of
71. Id. at 586.
72. Id. at 585-86.
73. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
74. The author wishes to thank Raymond T. Bonner for his generous assistance
in preparation of this portion of the note. Mr. Bonner, Director of the San Francisco
District Attorney's Consumer Fraud/White Collar Crime Unit, was co-counsel for re-
spondent, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.
75. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
76. Id. at 1826, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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expression. 77  Adding to this conclusion the important interest which
consumers have in making informed decisions as to "where their scarce
dollars are best spent,"' the Court declared:
[S]ociety also may have a strong interest in the free flow of com-
mercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though
entirely "commercial," may be of general public interest. ...
•.. Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who
is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price.... Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought
to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking
in a democarcy, we could not say -that the free flow of [commercial]
information does not serve that goal.79
The conclusion that "commercial speech, like other varieties, is
protected [by the first amendment]"80 implies that the validity of any
proposed advertising regulation must now be judged by a standard con-
siderably more rigorous than that used under the old commercial speech
doctrine."1 Therefore, the government's interest in regulating or sup-
pressing speech protected by the first amendment must be compelling, 2
and there must be no less burdensome means of regulation available to
achieve the state's goals.83 In the case of commercial advertising, the
interests of consumers in receiving a particular type of information and
advertisers' interest in disseminating that information have also been
weighed against the government's interest in regulation to determine the
degree of first amendment protection to be accorded a particular ad-
vertising scheme.84 In addition, the nature of the forum in which the
advertising is to be disseminated has been held to be an important
factor in deciding the extent of first amendment coverage8 5
In the discussion that follows it will be demonstrated that the
special nature of the forum in which television product advertising oc-
curs makes it particularly susceptible to regulation despite the protec-
tion of the first amendment. Moreover, it will be suggested that there
is a strong public policy against sex discrimination and its attendant sex
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1627.
80. Id. at 1830.
81. See generally Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94,
101-06 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (3 judge ct.), affd mem., 44 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. June 8,
1976) (No. 75-336).
82. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
83. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Buckley v. Valeo,
96 . CL 612, 637-38 (1976).
84. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Terry v. California
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 101-04 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (3 judge ct.), afI'd
mem., 44 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. June 8, 1976) (No. 75-336).
85. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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role stereotyping and that this policy elevates the already important
public interest in regulation of the electronic media to a compelling
state interest in ending sex role stereotyping in television product ad-
vertising. Conversely, it will be argued that, in the context of television
product advertising, the interest which broadcasters, consumers, and
advertisers might have in the free flow of demeaning images of women
is not sufficient to outweigh the government's interest in regulating those
images. Finally, it will be shown that a regulatory scheme can be
adopted by the FCC which neither burdens broadcast licensees unfairly
nor unconstitutionally inhibits the flow of commercial information.
The Duty To Serve the Public Interest
In determining whether regulation of television product advertising
can withstand the first amendment protection now available to com-
mercial speech, it is necessary to examine how the FCC's basic regu-
latory obligations interrelate with the national policy against sex dis-
crimination.
In the Fairness Report, a 1974 reevaluation of public interest
standards, 86 the commission severely limited its power to regulate adver-
tising in the public interest. While admitting that its original decision to
regulate cigarette advertising was based on broad public interest deter-
minations,87 the commission concluded that resolution of such public
interest controversies is now best left in the hands of Congress.8s In
reaching this conclusion, the commission expressed serious doubts as to
whether it is even capable of making public interest determinations
regarding sensitive issues such as those raised by the cigarette advertis-
ing controversy.8 9
To clear the way for a serious effort at redressing the inequities of
sex role stereotyping in television advertising, the FCC must be disabused
of this restrictive notion of its powers. The limitations created by the
commission's reevaluation of its authority over broadcast advertising do
not account for the impact of televised commercial speech on the Ameri-
can public. Nor do these limitations properly reflect the relationship
which the Communications Act9 was intended to establish between
86. Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 25, n.22.
87. See id., quoting Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 949 (1967) (citations
omitted).
88. "If in the future we are confronted with a case similar to that presented by the
cigarette controversy, it may be more appropriate to refer the matter to Congress for
resolution. For Congress is in a far better position than this Commission to develop
expert information on whether particular broadcast advertising is dangerous to health or
otherwise detrimental to the public interest." Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 25,
n.22.
89. Id. But see text accompanying notes 122-23 infra.
90. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
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broadcasters as government licensees and the FCC as licensing authority.
The privilege of television broadcasting has never been an unlimit-
ed right. The special nature of the electronic forum has tended to limit
the degree of first amendment protection available to users of that
forum.9 Free speech over the airways is also circumscribed by a re-
sponsibility to the public. 92 The unique and powerful nature of the tele-
vision medium has always subjected it to closer regulation than that im-
posed on other forms of media.9 3  As the Supreme Court has empha-
sized: "[a]lthough broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First
Amendment interest . . . differences in the characteristic of news
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them."94
Television plays a central role variously described as "[our most
important educator of an informed people,"95 and "the only means of
truly mass communication '98 in a populous society. The airwaves
which carry this influential medium are a scarce and valuable asset in
the public domain.9 7  The federal government, through the FCC, is
91. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10; see also Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Special concern over commercial speech
in the electronic media has a long history. In Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners
in Optometry, Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, noted that as far back as 1928,
counsel for the Federal Radio Commission (forerunner of the FCC) "rejected the con-
tention that . . . consideration of a licensee's past advertising practices might amount
to censorship, partly on the ground of a 'necessary distinction between restrictions placed
upon the transmission of intelligence for which there is a general public demand and
need and limitations imposed upon broadcasting propaganda, intended to obtain commer-
cial success, for which there is no such demand or need."' Head v. New Mexico Bd. of
Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 421, 439 n.15 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (ci-
tation omitted). Justice Brennan also noted that "[during the mid-1930's. . . the Com-
mission repeatedly warned that advertising excesses and the use of commercial material
offensive to the listening public might constitute grounds for the cancellation of a
license." Id. at 439-40.
92. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02, 109-10, 125
(1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 213-14, 218, 226-27 (1943); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,
333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.C.D.C. 1971) (3 judge ct.), affd mem. sub nom. Capital
Broadcasting v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
93. See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-19, 226-27 (1943).
94. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (citation
omitted).
95. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 653
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
96. Id. at 653-54.
97. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 213, 216-17 (1943).
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empowered by the Communications Act98 to grant qualified individuals
licenses to use portions of this resource in the public interest.9 9 Operat-
ing authority conferred by such a license is temporary, subject to period-
ic renewal if, in the judgment of the commission, the licensee has
properly served the public. ° ° Thus, broadcasting, unlike almost any
other private business, is intimately bound both to the government and
to public service.' An extended quotation from an opinion by Circuit
Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger amplifies this all-important concept:
The argument that a broadcaster is not a public utility is beside
the point. True it is not a public utility in the same sense as strictly
regulated common carriers or purveyors of power, but neither is
it a purely private enterprise like a newspaper or an automobile
agency. A broadcaster has much in common with a newspaper
publisher, but he is not in the same category in terms of public
obligations imposed by law. A broadcaster seeks and is granted
the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the
public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by
enforceable public obligations. A newspaper can be operated at
the whim or caprice of its owners; a broadcast station cannot. Af-
ter nearly five decades of operation the broadcast industry does
not seem to have grasped the simple fact that a broadcast license
is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty.' 0 2
Broadcast licensees are thus not only speakers in the traditional
sense of the first amendment, but also administrators of a valued com-
munications resource.' This dual role demands that a licensee's consti-
tutional interests in first amendment protection be accommodated with
the interests of the general public. Service in the "public convenience,
98. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974).
99. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970). See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
100. "The policy of the [Communications] Act is clear that no person is to have
anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the granting of a license.
Licenses are limited to a maximum of three years' duration, may be revoked, and need
not be renewed. Thus the channels presently occupied remain free for a new assignment
to another licensee in the interest of the listening public. Plainly, it is not the purpose of
the Act to protect a licensee against competition but to protect the public." Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1209 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1971), quoting
FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940). See also 47 U.S.C. §
301 (1970).
101. See note 92 supra.
102. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
i003 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d), 309(a) (1970). See also
Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
103. Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 654
(D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 389 (1969).
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interest, or necessity"104 has thus been recognized as critical to deciding
which among many competing groups is to gain access to the limited
space available in the television broadcasting spectrum. 105 To obtain
and keep a license, an applicant must demonstrate its ability to respond
to the needs of the entire community within the area of the broadcast
signal. 10 Moreover, the public interest must take precedence over the
interests of either the licensee or the broadcast advertiser.l1
7
Because it is charged with deciding policy questions relevant to
licensing, 08 the FCC is "more than a traffic policeman concerned with
the technical aspects of broadcasting."' 0 9 As mentioned above, a broad-
cast license confers a temporary, revocable privilege coupled with an
affirmative obligation to serve the changing needs of the public." 0 As
guardian of the public's interest in the airwaves,1" the commission must
104. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970). See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
105. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216, 227 (1943). As early as the time of
the Federal Radio Commission (forerunner of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion), it was recognized that the public interest must be the criterion for alleviating the
chaos of unregulated broadcasting in the limited airwave spectrum. Act of Feb. 23,
1927, ch. 169, § 2, 44 Stat 1162 (repealed 1934). Congressman White, a sponsor of the
1927 Radio Act, made this view clear in the following comment on the need for
legislation to regulate the burgeoning broadcast industry: "[I1n the present state of
scientific development there must be a limitation upon the number of broadcasting
stations and it [is] recommended that licenses should be issued only to those stations
whose operation would render a benefit to the public, are necessary in the public interest,
or would contribute to the development of the art." 67 CONG. REc. 5479 (1926). See
also Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2310 (1960).
106. It is the long standing policy of the FCC that each broadcast licensee must
"seek out and be responsive to a community's needs and interests." City of Camden, 18
F.C.C.2d 412, 419 (1969). The primary purpose of this "diligent, positive, and
continuing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires of
his community" is to "guarantee that the programming service will be rooted in the
people whom the station is obligated to serve." Sioux Empire Broadcasting Co., 16
F.C.C.2d 995, 998 (1969) (citation omitted).
107. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 139 n.2 (1940).
108. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1970).
109. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969). It is well-
established that the FCC has "not niggardly but expansive powers" and wide discretion
to adopt flexible procedures, rules, and orders to meet ever-changing communications
needs. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943).
110. See text accompanying notes 100-03, supra. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has commented on the conditional nature of a broadcast
license with specific regard to licensee advertising practices: "[W]e assume ... that
Congress may constitutionally condition the grant of a license to use the federally owned
broadcast frequencies upon an agreement by the licensees. . . that they will not, by the
use of those frequencies, derive revenue from promotion of products or activities deemed
by Congress unworthy of such promotion." New Jersey Lottery Comm'n v. United
States, 491 F.2d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 420 U.S. 371
(1975).
111. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973)
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judge the quality of that public interest service and, in doing so, "neither
exceed[s] its powers nor transgress[es] the first amendment in interest-
ing itself in general program format and the kinds of programs broad-
cast by licensees."12 That this wide-ranging review should mark the
relationship of the commission to the private industry of broadcast-
ing is indicated not only by the public trust nature of the airwaves but
also by the congressional objective of preventing the preemption of
broadcasting by the private goals of large American corporations."1 3
Defining the Public Interest: Taking a Cue From Public Policy
Despite the central importance of the public interest, what is meant
by that term does not fit neatly into a one-sentence definition. While
constrained by statutory and constitutional limitations and the general
rule against arbitrary or capricious decisions," 4 the definition of the
public interest has been allowed to evolve, precedent by precedent,
through years of FCC decisionmaking. 15 This gradual development is
appropriate. Flexibility is useful to the commission; a broad latitude in
defining the public interest allows the FCC to use its experience and
expertise to make licensing decisions which respond to the changing
needs of society. Allowing the commission to exercise wide discretion is
(Burger, C.J.); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969). See text
accompanying notes 92-110, supra.
112. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969). The Red Lion
court also noted, "Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amend-
ment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish." Id. In a recent case, the Supreme Court further explained the different first
amendment treatment to be accorded broadcasting in the electronic media. CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973), quoting Z.Z. CHAFEE, GovERN-
MENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 640-41 (1947).
113. See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1940). See
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 385-86 (1969); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 217-20 (1943). More recently, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit commented, "The only way that broadcasters can operate in the
'public interest' is by broadcasting programs that meet somebody's view of what is in the
'public interest.' That can scarcely be determined by the broadcaster himself, for he is
in an obvious conflict of interest." National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers
& Distrib., 516 F.2d 526, 536 (2d Cir. 1975).
114. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1943); Fidelity Television Inc.
v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 698-99 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 271-72 (1975);
Larus & Bro. Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 1971); McClatchy
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 18-19 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
918 (1957); Note, National Policy and the "Public Interest'-A Marriage of Necessity
in the Communications Act of 1934, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 386 (1966).
115. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969). See cases cited in note 116 infra.
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consistent with the well-accepted view that the commission, like other
federal agencies, possesses a great deal of specialized knowledge and
that therefore its judgments are to be upheld in the absence of clear
mistake or misapplication of authority. 116
It has been suggested that the FCC's freedom to ascertain and
define the public interest ends whenever "a national policy has been
clearly enunciated either by Congress or the courts-when either has
prescribed unequivocally a course of action for the nation to follow."
' 1 7
In such a situation, it is contended, the commission should temper its
independent judgment with the articulated policies.1 8  Thus, when
called upon to decide a case involving a clearly defined public policy,
the commission should assume the ministerial role of implementer and
facilitator of that policy rather than the discretionary role of administra-
tive tribunal.
An excellent example of how an articulated public policy can and
should guide the decision to regulate television advertising was provided
by former Commissioner Nicholas Johnson in a separate statement filed
with a 1970 opinion concerning anti-smoking commercials." 9  At that
time Johnson concluded that because of the hazards of cigarette smok-
ing and television's role in molding public opinion, Congress and the
courts had imposed an affirmative duty on broadcasters to insure that
"the public . . .continue to be adequately alerted [through the broad-
cast media]" even after cigarette advertising has been banned from
those media.' 20 According to Johnson, this duty "rests firmly on a
116. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970); 47 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970). See also CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102, 122 (1973); FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S.
223, 226 (1946); NBC v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (Hand,
J.), affd, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
117. Note, National Policy and the "Public lnterest'---A Marriage of Necessity in
the Communications Act of 1934, 114 U. PA. L REv. 386, 387 (1966). See McLean
Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 86-88 (1944) (analogy with Interstate
Commerce Commission); Larus & Bro. Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876, 880 (4th Cir. 1971);
Retail Store Employees Union Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969); cf. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973).
118. Note, 114 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 117, at 387.
119. Cigarette Advertising-Anti Smoking Presentations, 27 F.C.C.2d 453 (1970),
aff'd sub nom. Larus & Bro. Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971).
120. Cigarette Advertising-Anti Smoking Presentations, 27 F.C.C.2d 453, 462
(1970). In affirming the FCC decision in which Commissioner Johnson concurred in
part and dissented in part, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
made the following observation: "[C]ontroversy is not essential to a station's obligation
to present programs about the effect of smoking on health. This duty does not rest
merely on the fairness doctrine. The fundamental basis of this obligation is the
licensee's responsibility to serve the public interest .... A station's treatment of this
subject is pertinent to renewal of its license." Larus & Bro. Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876,
883 (4th Cir. 1971).
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public interest rationale which has been well articulated in previous
commission and court precedent and in the congressional intent under-
girding the 1969 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act."'121
Defining the public interest in terms of public policy not only
fulfills a mandate articulated by the legislature and the courts, but also
provides the public interest with added substance and clarity. Such
definition is preferable to an interpretation formulated at the FCC's
discretion, which may or may not adequately account for national public
policy. 12 2 In addition, defining the public interest in this way would
allay the commission's own fears concerning the vagueness of the public
interest standard 12 and, more important, would enhance the case for
any proposed advertising regulation by strengthening the commission's
position in the balance which must be used to weigh the legitimacy of
commercial speech regulation. 124
At the time of license renewal, a licensee "must literally 'run on his
record,' ,"12' and if at that time, the record shows that the public interest
in regulating television advertising has not been adequately served, the
commission should take responsibility for changing that situation. In
evaluating any proposed regulation of commercial speech, it is sub-
mitted that the interest in regulating television product commercials
which conflict with a national policy against sex role stereotyping out-
weighs the first amendment interests of product advertisers. It will
undoubtedly be argued, however, that, in meeting its responsibility,
the commission runs the risk of starting down a "slippery slide" of
programming regulation which will inevitably restrict free expression. 126
Two considerations, however, should answer this argument. First, the
regulation to be suggested here pertains only to commercial product
advertising, and not to any other aspect of programming.12 7  Second,
121. Cigarette Advertising-Anti Smoking Presentations, 27 F.C.C.2d 453, 466
(1970), afj'd sub nom. Larus & Bro. Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971).
122. In the past, a strong public policy upon which it could rely has won for the
FCC judicial approval of its regulation of television broadcasting. For example, in part
because "[tihe public health standard remove[d] much of the vagueness and over-
breadth attending the standard of the public interest," the United States Court of Appeals
affirmed the FCC's decision to regulate televised cigarette advertising in accordance with
the fairness doctrine. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
123. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
124. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
125. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J.).
126. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 842 (1969); Cigarette Advertising-Anti Smoking Presentations, 27 F.C.C.2d
453, 472 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Larus & Bro. Co., 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971).
127. See text accompanying notes 28-72 supra.
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and more important, since the FCC is required to evaluate the public
interest performance of broadcast licensees, it cannot avoid making
judgments. To be apprehensive over what the commission might decide
about the image of women in television product advertising is to forget
that the FCC is an administrative law tribunal. As former commissioner
Nicholas Johnson explained:
1O]bviously, at some point, [the] Commission must decide that
a licensee is wrong in his determination of what the public interest
requires, and I do not see how we can do this unless we substitute
our judgment for the licensee's. Whatever may be the initial re-
sponsibility of the licensee, some agency must arbitrate competing
uses of our scarce national airwaves-and that task has been as-
signed to the Federal Communications Commission, with review
by the courts.1 28
Exercise by the FCC of this regulatory responsibility need not
mean the beginning of wholesale censorship or unbridled government
interference with freedom of expression. Only those public interest
issues raised to the level of important public policy by clear legislative
and judicial pronouncements should warrant the commission's regula-
tion of commercial advertising content.
The Public Interest Defined: Public Policy Against Sex Role Stero-
typing
The foregoing discussion suggests that, given the importance of
the FCC's duty to regulate the airwaves for the public's benefit, rein-
forcement of the FCC's public interest standard by a national policy
against sex discrimination and sex role stereotyping could create a
compelling governmental interest in FCC regulation of product adver-
ising which would outweigh the first amendment interests of advertisers.
It therefore remains to be seen whether there is in fact a well-defined
public policy of ending sex role stereotyping which is strong enough to
tip the balance in favor of regulation. It is suggested that a growing
body of judicial decisions and congressional actions provides substantial
evidence to support the conclusion that there is such a policy.
Some of the best examples of that evidence are to be found in recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In the landmark case of
Frontiero v. Richardson,'29 the Supreme Court struck down as unconsti-
tutional a statutory system of unequal treatment of servicewomen seek-
ing military benefits. Admittedly the judgment of the court was only
128. Cigarette Advertising-Anti Smoking Presentations, 27 F.C.C.2d 453, 471
(1970) (Johnson, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part), affd sub nom.
Larus & Bro. Co. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes
78-99 supra.
129. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan on behalf of four justices.
Nonetheless, the condemnation of sex role stereotyping contained in that
opinion appears to have been accepted by four additional justices who
concurred in the result, differing with the plurality opinion solely on the
issue of whether sex is a suspect classification for purposes of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.13 °
The Court in Frontiero recognized that the "long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination" in our country has often been rationalized
by a sex role stereotype of 'romantic paternalism' which. . . put women
not on a pedestal, but in a cage."'' Furthermore, the Court noted that
"this paternalistic attitude became so firmly rooted in our national
consciousness""112 that it was even enshrined in the opinions of the
Supreme Court."' The opinion observed that although there has been
much improvement since the 19th century, when "the position of wom-
en in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks
under the pre-Civil War slave codes,""' 4 women still confront pervasive
discrimination. 1 5 Justice Brennan demonstrated the increasing con-
gressional concern with this issue by providing an extensive list of
legislative enactments which indicate that "[C]ongress itself has con-
cluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious.""' 6
130. Id. at 691-92.
131. Id. at 684.
132. Id.
133. "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many
of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of woman are
to fulfill the noble and benign office of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator." Id. at 684-85, quoting Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873)
(Bradley, J., concurring).
134. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
135. Id. at 686.
136. Id. at 687, n.21. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2108 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending id. §
2108 (1970) (eliminating sex based distinctions in eligibility preferences for veterans
benefits); id. § 5924 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending id. § 5924 (1970) (eliminating sex
based distinctions in provisions for cost of living allowances to dependents of federal
employees living in a foreign area); id. § 7152 (Supp. IV, 1974) (eliminating all sex
based distinctions in federal employment benefits and all discrimination in executive
agency or federal competitive service on the basis of marital status); id. § 8341 (Supp.
IV, 1974) (eliminating sex based distinctions in eligibility for survivors' benefits un-
der federal employees' retirement plans); Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691-91e (Supp. IV, 1974) (prohibiting all discrimination because of sex or
marital status in credit transactions); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-83 (Supp. IV, 1974) (prohibiting sex discrimination in federally assisted
educational programs and activities); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1970) (prohibiting sex discrimination in the payment of wages); 37 U.S.C. § 401(3)
(Supp. IV, 1974), amending id. § 401(3) (1970) (eliminating the sex based differential
in military benefits which was at issue in the Frontiero case); 38 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp.
IV, 1974), amending id. § 102(b) (1970) (eliminating sex based distinctions in
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Similar criticism of both sex discrimination and sex role stereotyp-
ig appeared in the recent case of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld. 3 7 In that
case, a seven person majority of the Court struck down sex based
distinctions in eligibility requirements for survivors' ("widows' ") ben-
efits under section 402(g) of the Social Security Act.13 Citing Fronti-
ero as a precedent, the Court attacked as unconstitutional statutory
distinctions between the sexes created by stereotypes about women,
stating:
In . . . Frontiero the challenged [classification] based on sex
[was] premised on overbroad generalizations that could not be tol-
erated under the Constitution . . . IThe assumption . . . was
that female spouses of servicemen would normally be dependent
upon their husbands, while male spouses of servicewomen would
not. A virtually identical "archaic and overbroad" generalization
"not. .. tolerated under the Constitution" underlies the distinc-
tion drawn by § 402(g), namely, that male workers' earnings are
vital to the support of their families, while the earnings of female
wage earners do not significantly contribute to their families' sup-
port.1 39
determining dependency for purposes of veterans benefits); Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974) (prohibiting, among
other things, sex discrimination in virtually all employment); Act of Nov. 14, 1975, Pub.
L. 94-130, 89 Stat. 684, amending 22 U.S.C.A. § 2504(a) (Pamphlet No. 1, Mar. 1976)
(forbidding sex discrimination with respect to enrollment and terms and conditions of
service of Peace Corps volunteers); Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, H.R.J. Res. 208, 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) (prohibiting the passage of any law
which discriminates on the basis of sex).
In the specific area of employment discrimination, it is interesting to note that the
federal courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that the congressional
purpose in enacting equal employment opportunity legislation includes the elimination of
distinctions based on sex and sex role stereotyping. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Lake Oswego
School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3285 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (No. 568); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d
661, 663 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual
Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204-05, 208 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 96
S. Ct. 1202 (1976); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,
720 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th
Cir. 1969).
It is also significant that at least one state legislature has acted to prohibit sex role
stereotyping in one communications medium. The California Education Code provides,
in part, that "[wihen adopting instructional materials for use in schools, governing
boards shall include only instructional materials which, in their determination, accurately
portray the cultural and racial diversity of our society, including: (a) The contribution
of both men and women in all types of roles, including professional, vocational, and
executive roles .... " CAL. EDUC. CODE § 9240 (West 1975). See id. §§ 9002, 9243
(West 1975).
137. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970).
139. 420 U.S. at 643, quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507-08 (1975)
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In reaching its conclusion, the Court in Wiesenfeld rejected the stereo-
typed notion that the mother is the principal child-rearing spouse,
reasoning:
[I]t is no less important for a child to be cared for by its sole
surviving parent when that parent is male rather than a female.
And a father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to the "companionship, care, custody, and management"
of "the children he has sired and raised, [and that right] undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection."' 4 0
In light of these conclusions and the legislative purpose behind section
402(g) of the Social Security Act, "[to enable] the surviving parent to
remain at home to care for a child,"'' the Court concluded that "the
gender-based distinction of 402(g) is entirely irrational."' 42
A final example of the policy against sex role stereotyping is
provided by the case of Taylor v. Louisiana.143  In Taylor, the court
noted statistical evidence which demonstrated the distortions resulting
from sex role stereotypes which excluded from Louisiana juries any
woman who had not filed a statement of willingness to serve. The court
rejected its own previously expressed stereotypes of women and provid-
ed an illuminating statistical glimpse at the true role which women play
in American society:
In Hoyt v. Florida, the Court placed some emphasis on the notion
...that "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family
life." Statistics compiled by the Department of Labor indicate that
in October, 1974, 54.2% of all women between 18 and 64 years of
age were in the labor force. Additionally, in March, 1974, 45.7%
of women with children under the age of 18 were in the labor force;
with respect to families containing children between the ages of six
and 17, 67.3 % of mothers who were widowed, divorced, or separat-
ed were in the work force, while 51.2% of the mothers whose hus-
bands were present in the household were in the work force. Even
(citations omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, per-
suaded by cases such as Frontiero, has concluded that "it is impermissible under the
equal protection clause to classify on the basis of stereotyped assumptions concerning
propensities thought to exist in some members of a given sex." White v. Fleming, 522
F.2d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1975).
140. 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1974), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972). It is interesting to note that the Wiesenfeld case, involving equal rights for men
to the payment of Social Security benefits, serves as a useful illustration of the
stereotypes which deny equal rights to women. This example reinforces the idea that the
goal of attacking sex role stereotyping is not securing special treatment for women but
rather attaining equal treatment for all persons, regardless of sex.
141. Id. at 651.
142. Id. See Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 399 F. Supp. 118,
125-31 (D. Md. 1975) (3 judge ct.); Silbowitz v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
397 F. Supp. 862, 867-71 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
143. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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in family units in which the husband was present and which con-
tained a child under three years old, 31% of the mothers were in
the work force. [These statistics] certainly put to rest the sugges-
tion that all women should be exempt from jury service based
solely on their sex and the presumed role in the home.144
The above examples are indicative of a well articulated national
policy against sex role stereotyping and sex discrimination. From
previous discussion 145 it is apparent that such a policy adds weight and
clarity to the FCC's public interest standard. It is suggested that
if the commission adopts that strengthened standard in weighing its
regulatory responsibility against the first amendment interests of prod-
uct advertisers, 46 the commission must conclude that regulation of sex
role stereotyping in television product advertising is within the scope of
its duties. However, in order to reach this conclusion after the exten-
sion of first amendment protection to commercial speech, 47 the various
interests of consumers, advertisers, and broadcasters must be balanced
against the government's interest in regulation. Only if the govern-
ment's interest in eradicating sex discrimination outweighs both the ad-
vertiser's and the broadcaster's interest in disseminating and the con-
sumer's interest in receiving demeaning televised images of women in
advertising will a proposed regulation prevail.' 48
In light of the above legislative and judicial authority it seems
clear that a reasonable regulation of the manner in which women are
portrayed in television product advertising would withstand a first
amendment challenge based on either consumers', advertisers', or broad-
casters' rights to receive or disseminate stereotyped images of women.
As will be demonstrated in the remaining discussion, regulation of sex
role stereotyping in advertising can and should be designed to change
an image of women deemed by Congress and the courts to be inimical
to all segments of American society, including advertisers, broadcasters,
and citizens as consumers. Moreover, this type of regulation need not
unconstitutionally restrict the flow of commercial information which is
144. Id. at 535 n.17 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also held that
"[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family,
and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.. . . Women's activities
and responsibilities are increasing and expanding." Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-
15 (1975). See also Turner v. Dept. of Employment Security & Bd. of Review, 96 S. Ct.
249 (1975) (per curiam).
145. See text accompanying notes 114-24 supra.
146. See text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
147. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
148. See id.; Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 101-06
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (3 judge ct.), affd mem., 44 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. June 8, 1976)
(No. 75-336).
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now considered vital to advertisers' and consumers' effective participa-
tion in our market economy."'
The Character of the Regulation:
Citizen Action To Change a Negative Image
The procedure contemplated by this note would require the FCC,
at the time of license renewal, to respond to citizen complaints about
women's roles in television advertising with an evaluation of licensee
efforts to insure a fair and equitable portrayal of women in product
advertising. It should now be apparent that both constitutional law and
legislative and judicial articulations of policy provide substantial justi-
fication for such regulation. However, it is also apparent that to be ac-
ceptable, any such procedure must take into account the duty of the
commission to guard the public's interest, the first amendment rights of
self-expression and editorial discretion to which advertisers and broad-
casters are entitled, and the right of the public to receive commercial
advertising information. Moreover, to pass muster under the first
amendment, it must be demonstrated that a proposed regulatory scheme
is no more of a burden on either consumers, advertisers, or broadcasters
than is necessary to achieve the legitimate goals of that regulation. x50
Before proceeding to set forth the actual mechanism which should
be used, it is important to emphasize that the regulatory scheme should
not be a mere extension of the commission's fairness doctrine to adver-
tisements which portray women in stereotyped roles. The fairness
doctrine requires that broadcast licensees provide, at their own expense,
a reasonable opportunity for the airing of opposing views on controver-
sial issues of public importance.15' As previously mentioned,' 52 the
scope of this doctrine has been expanded to include not only political
debate but also advertising which either explicitly or implicitly states a
position on a controversial issue. 5 ' Nonetheless, however adequate the
fairness doctrine may have been in the case of cigarette advertising or
air pollution, it is decidedly inadequate for the task of achieving an
equitable representation of women in television advertising.
149. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
150. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 96
S. Ct. 612, 637-38 (1976).
151. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110-12 (1973); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-86, 391 (1969). See Obligations of
Broadcast Licensees Under the Fairness Doctrine, 23 F.C.C.2d 27, 28 (1970); Editorial-
izing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949); 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970).
152. See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
153. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
[Vol. 28
The essence of the fairness doctrine is the licensee's obligation to
make available a reasonable amount of broadcast time to those who
have a different view from that which has already been expressed over
the air regarding a controversial issue of public importance.' 54 The
essence of a solution to the problem of sex role stereotyping in television
product advertising, however, lies not in perpetuating a debate but
rather in guaranteeing a truly representative portrayal of women. Thus,
successful regulation must change the image of women in television
commercials rather than air a controversy over what that image should
be.
In the search for a regulatory scheme which will successfully
change the image of women in television advertising, it is obvious that
outright censorsfip by the FCC is to be avoided.15 Given that basic
guideline, a solution to the problem seems to lie in the very nature of
the sex role stereotyping now prevalent in television advertisements. A
stereotype of women is not created by a single advertisement showing a
woman doing her family's laundry with a marvelous new soap. Rather,
stereotyped images are built up by repetitive broadcasting of a variety of
feminine images all of which tend to portray women as creatures who
are limited to certain social roles and incapable of pursuing the variety
of careers available to men.' 56  There is nothing wrong with a single
television commercial depicting a woman in the kitchen, cooking dinner
and caring for her children. The problem arises when the majority of
television commercials convey the idea that those tasks are the only ones
that women ever perform. As one theorist stated the problem:
[E]xcessive exposure [to television commercials] increases both
the opportunity for and the probability of television advertising af-
fecting the average viewer. When a particular happening is
viewed as a single "discrete event" the influence on the viewer is
154. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
155. In fact, the FCC is prohibited by statute from imposing any kind of censor-
ship. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970). This restriction does not mean, however, that every
condition imposed by the FCC on the grant of a broadcast license amounts to an
interference with freedom of speech. See Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729,
733 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See text accompanying note 112 supra. Public interest determi-
nations made by the FCC have frequently been held not to constitute censorship. See
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943); Brandywine-Main Line Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973);
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969); Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 364 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1964).
156. "A wide differential in the number of instances in which one or the other sex
is portrayed regarding a certain criterion elevate the individual instances of a single
person's depiction to a characterization of the entire sex." Silverstein & Silverstein,
supra note 4, at 77-78. See text accompanying notes 4-15, supra.
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negligible. It is only when many of these "subtle discrete events"
are viewed that there is a cumulative effect on the viewer.' 57
Thus, no one advertisement or advertiser can be singled out as the
source of the problem. Rather than discriminate against any one
commercial, a regulatory scheme must aim at counteracting the negative
images of women now pervading television advertising. Instead of
attempting to censor any particular commercials arbitrarily deemed
offensive to women,15s the commission should encourage a continuing
effort to monitor the overall image of women in television product
advertising. 159
157. Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 4, at 73, quoting Schneider & Hacker, Sex
Role Imagery and Use of the Generic 'Man' in Introductory Texts: A Case in the
Sociology of Sociology, 8 AM. SOCIOLOGY 12, 13 (1973).
An instructive analogy to the "cumulative effect" argument is provided by the
Federal Trade Commission's rulings on the deceptiveness of various television commer-
cials. In reaching decisions on the effects of television advertising, the FTC frequently
relies not on what is explicitly said in a particular commercial but rather on the net
impression left with the viewing audience: "In evaluating the capacity of an advertise-
ment to deceive, the net impression of the advertisement, evaluated from the perspective
of the audience to whom the advertisement is directed, is controlling." Pfizer, Inc., 81
F.T.C. 23, 58 (1972).
158. An argument could be made that television viewers should be shielded from
unchecked broadcasting of sex role stereotypes in advertising on the ground that
demeaning images of women on television invade the privacy of a large percentage of the
population who are offended by such images being forced into their living rooms through
the television set. See generally Erznoznick v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-
09 (1975); Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
Significantly, the interest in privacy has been used in the past as a basis for
regulating commercial speech. In Breard v. City of Alexandria, the Supreme Court
pitted the first amendment rights of commercial speakers against the right to privacy. In
the course of upholding a local ordinance which forbade entering a private residence for
the purpose of commercial solicitation without prior consent, the Supreme Court held
that constitutional protections do "not make a state or a city impotent to guard its
citizens against the annoyances of life because the regulation may restrict the manner of
doing a legitimate business. . . . It would be . . . a misuse of the great guarantees of
free speech and free press to use those guarantees to force a community to admit the
solicitors of publications to the home premises of its residents." Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632, 645 (1951).
It would seem to be an equally undesirable misuse of the first amendment to claim
that, in the interest of free speech, television advertisers are free to intrude upon private
homelife at all hours of the day and broadcast to the citizenry images of women which
clearly work against the public interest of the United States. The Breard decision made
clear that "those communities [which find] methods of sale obnoxious may control them
by ordinance." Id. at 645. Similarly, when the Congress and the courts have enunciat-
ed a public policy which finds sex role stereotypes and discrimination based thereon to
be abhorrent, it is reasonable and consistent with that policy for the federal agency
charged with overseeing the public interest in the airwaves to take steps which will
implement that policy.
159. On the other hand, it is important to note that the commission need not grant
a right of access to those in the community claiming unfair representation of women in
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For several reasons, responsibility for achieving the objectives of
the suggested regulation would rest with the individual broadcast licen-
sees rather than with advertisers or national television networks. First,
only broadcast licensees are subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the
FCC.10 Commission regulations already require that each licensee
keep programming and advertising logs' 6 ' which could easily be adapt-
ed to the task of monitoring the image of women in product commer-
cials.1 2 Moreover, unlike the individual advertiser, or even a national
television network, the broadcast licensee can monitor the total content
of the advertising broadcast from its station. 16  Second, it is firmly
established that in return for the privilege conferred by a broadcast
license, each licensee assumes personal responsibility for everything
broadcast over the station's allotted portion of the airwaves. For exam-
ple, it has been noted:
[B]roadcast licensees must assume responsibility for all material
which is broadcast through their facilities. This includes all pro-
grams and advertising material which they present to the public
... . This duty is personal to the licensee and may not be dele-
gated. He is obligated to bring his positive responsibility affirma-
commercials. In CBS the Supreme Court held that for the FCC to require even a
limited paid right of access to broadcast air time for purposes of responding to editorial
advertising would infringe upon the first amendment rights of broadcasters and create an
objectionable enlargement of the FCC's regulatory powers. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121-31 (1973).
Creating a similar right of access to purchase time for advertisements to counter sex
role stereotyping would, as the Court in CBS pointed out, continue to restrict access to
those who could afford the high price of television advertising and would also surrender
the independent judgment of the licensee to the many voices that would inevitably
clamor for advertising time. Id. at 124-25. Furthermore, a right of access would mean
an objectionable enlargement of the FCC's involvement with the day-to-day operations
of broadcast licensees. Id. at 127. The regulation proposed in this note would, in
contrast, preserve the discretion of the licensee, albeit within certain guidelines regarding
sex role stereotyping, and would further direct licensee efforts to the more manageable
task of influencing both networks and advertisers. In addition, the regulation would
restrict FCC supervision to the established procedure of review at the time of license
renewal. 47 U.S.C. § 307-09 (1970).
160. See 47 U.S.C. § 303, 307-09 (1970).
161. 47 C.F.R. § 73.670-.673 (1975).
162. The FCC has authority to "make general rules and regulations requiring
stations to keep such records of programs, transmissions of energy, communications, or
signals as it may deem desirable." 47 U.S.C. § 303(j) (1970). See also id. § 303(r)
(1970).
163. The ease with which a broadcast licensee can monitor its programming was
cited as partial justification for requiring radio broadcasters to know the content of drug
oriented music. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The court in Yale further justified this type of regulation on the ground that its effect
would be to impart to the licensee the knowledge which is needed to serve the public
interest effectively. Id. at 600. See Foreign Language Programs, 38 Fed. Reg. 5523
(1967).
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tively to bear upon all who have a hand in providing broadcast
material for transmission through his facilities so as to assure the
discharge of his duty to provide acceptable program schedules con-
sonant with operating in the public interest in his community.
16 4
Thus, a broadcast license already obligates each licensee to be respon-
sive to the public interest of the broadcast community served by that
licensee's signal. 165 Failure to fulfill this obligation can mean chal-
lenges to and possible revocation of a licensee's operating authority at
the time of license renewal. 66 It would therefore seem reasonable to
add to the licensee's public interest obligation the responsibility, 67
dictated by national public policy, to meet adequately the interest of the
community in eradicating sex role stereotypes in product advertising.l"s
As with any theoretical scheme, the above proposal is somewhat
idealistic, since in many cases television licensees do not have exclusive
control over the advertising transmitted by their stations. 169  In the case
164. Commission En Bane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2313-14 (1960).
See Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 925-26 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Banz-
haf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); Ben S.
McGlashan, 2 F.C.C. 145, 152 (1935) (licensee responsibility for advertising as well as
programming). See also Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S.
424, 437, 441 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (licensee responsibility for advertising).
165. The established standard is "diligent, positive, and continuing effort by the
licensee to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires of his community.
Commission En Bane Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2316 (1960).
166. See text accompanying notes 100-13 supra. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-09
(1970).
167. The notion of licensee responsibility rather than advertiser responsibility for
the sexist content of advertising is consistent with the principle that the medium which
disseminates objectionable commercial speech takes on an identity with the producers of
that speech. In one case, the Supreme Court dealt with the argument that a publisher's
first amendment rights are unfairly abridged by regulation of commercial speech dissemi-
nated through that publisher's newspaper outlets. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The specific question presented to
the Court was whether "the conduct of the newspaper [was] entitled to a protection
under the first amendment which the Court held in [Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942)] was not available to a commercial advertiser." Id. at 386. The Court
concluded that commercial speech does not lose its character simply because some
editorial judgment may be used in selecting one advertisement over another for publica-
tion. The Court held that the editorializing involved in a selection of advertising material
could not afford that advertising greater first amendment protection than it would have
received if considered alone. Id. at 387. Thus, a television broadcaster who alleges
infringement of his first amendment right to choose the type of commercials to be aired
should be afforded no more protection than is available to the commercial speech from
which he makes his selection.
168. The FCC itself seems to have recognized that, in general the needs of women
in the community are components of the broadcast licensee's public interest obligation.
See City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412, 422 (1969); L. KANowrrz, SEx ROLES IN LAW
AND SOCIETY 633 (1973). See also ABC, 52 F.C.C.2d 98, 105 (1975); NBC, 52 F.C.C.
2d 273, 286-88 (1975).
169. The following material in the text concerning the interrelationships among
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of an independent television station, which enjoys autonomy in the se-
lection of advertising, the licensee could take full responsibility for meet-
ig the requirements of proposed sex role stereotyping regulations.' 70 A
licensee with a network affiliation, however, does not have complete dis-
cretion over the types of commercials which are broadcast. Much of
such licensees' programming and advertising is provided to them in
packages by the national networks. A licensee who agrees to accept a
network broadcast must also accept the advertising which the network
has already sold for that program.'
Nevertheless, a regulatory scheme which would impose responsi-
bility on the individual licensee is in most respects realistic. Even
licensees affiliated with national networks retain control over the sale of
advertising for locally produced and non network programming; time
slots between network programs are also sold directly by local sta-
tions.172  Furthermore, the parent corporations of the three major tele-
vision networks own a number of local broadcasting stations in key
product marketing areas. 3  In the case of these owned and operated
stations, the broadcast licensee does not lack control, since it is also the
owner of the affiliated television network. 7 Pressure on the networks
to comply with the proposed regulation would be particularly great in
the case of owned and operated stations, since it would be absurd for the
networks' parent corporations to allow broadcasting of commercials
which would jeopardize their own broadcast licenses. 5
Although most licensees do not have this kind of direct control
over the sale of network advertising, they could still wield tremendous
broadcast licensees, television networks, and the networks' parent corporations was
obtained in an interview with Mr. Jules Dundes, Director of the Mass Media Institute at
Stanford University and formerly Vice President for Station Administration of CBS
Radio in Palo Alto, California, Jan. 30, 1976 [hereinafter referred to as Dundes Inter-
view].
170. Current statistics indicate that there are some 702 commercial television
stations in the United States. TELEVISION DIGEST-ADDENDA TO TELEVISION FAcTBooK
No. 45, Dec. 29, 1975 at 45Q. Of this number, the Columbia Broadcasting System
claims 213 affiliates, the American Broadcasting Company 225 affiliates, and the
National Broadcasting Company 195 affiliates. TELEVISION FACrBOOK No. 45 104a-
105a, 109a-110a, 115a-116a (Services Vol. 1976). Without accounting for overlap
resulting from one station being affiliated with more than one network, these figures
reveal that at least sixty-nine commercial television stations are unaffiliated with any of
the major television networks.
171. Dundes Interview, supra note 169.
172. Id.
173. Id. Each Network owns five stations, for a total of fifteen, all of which are
located in the largest urban areas of the United States. TELEVISION FACTOOK No. 45
561-b, 562-b, 563-b (Station's Vol. 1976).
174. Dundes Interview, supra note 169.
175. Id.
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influence. If local television stations were held responsible by the FCC
for balancing the image of women in television product advertising, the
networks would have a vested interest in listening to their affiliates'
demands for a change in advertising diet.1"" Ignoring network affili-
ates' requests for change would make it impossible for these affiliates to
fulfill the public interest obligation outlined in the proposed regulation,
thereby raising the possibility of numerous license challenges brought
against the very outlets upon which the networks depend for survival.
Thus, a regulatory scheme which focused responsibility on the
individual licensee would encourage local network affiliates to use what-
ever influence they had with their parent networks to change the image
of women in product advertising. In effect, each licensee would be-
come a lobbyist, working on behalf of the public to change network, and
thereby advertisers', policies toward sex roles portrayed in television
commercials.
Whatever regulation is adopted should keep FCC interference with
the licensee at a minimum and reserve scrutiny of the licensee for license
renewal time.177 This scrutiny should be based on cumulative perform-
ance since, as previously discussed,' 78 the problem of sex role stereotyp-
ing results not from any individual commercial but rather from the
overall image of women portrayed repetitively over a long period of
time. Under this type of regulation, a licensee would not have to fear
that broadcasting a single sexist commercial would jeopardize its li-
cense, since only a proven pattern of recurring stereotypes would war-
rant commission action. Post hoe scrutiny of this type would also avoid
prior restraint of advertising material' 79 and, at the same time, promote
176. Id.
177. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 109-10, 126-27
(1973).
178. See text accompanying notes 151-58 supra.
179. In Pittsburgh Press, the Supreme Court pointed out that "the protection against
prior restraint at common law barred only a system of administering censorship."
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390
(1973). The regulatory scheme proposed in this note specifically avoids transforming
the FCC into an administrative censor of advertising. Instead, the proposed regulation
would provide for FCC response to citizen complaints in the form of a mandatory
evaluation of a licensee's past advertising practices and, if necessary, an evidentiary
hearing to decide whether or not those practices violated the licensee's obligation to serve
the public interest. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Pittsburgh Press, a regulatory
scheme which operates only in proven cases of repetitive conduct does not result in the
type of speculative and arbitrary restraint which endangers protected speech through
prior restraint. Id. at 390. See also New Jersey Lottery Comm'n v. United States, 491
F.2d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 420 U.S. 371 (1975);
Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 55-56 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); Veterans & Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional
Comm'r of Customs, 459 F.2d 676, 681-83 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 933
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the licensee's independent judgment and journalistic discretion. As one
court has stated, "[lit is more in the public interest to let the licensee
interpret the exemptions himself than to command what might become a
system of precensorship."' 80  Thus, the proposed regulation would not
ban any particular product advertisement from television.18 1  Instead, it
would merely specify that the public interest duty already incumbent on
each licensee requires a balanced image of women in product commer-
cials. The burden involved would be no more severe than that already
borne by licensees as a result of other public interest criteria which the
FCC promulgates.':8  This type of regulation would withstand chal-
lenge based on the first amendment. First, the content of the advertise-
ments is commercial speech which, even after the Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer case, is still characterized as a particularly hardy breed of speech
and therefore susceptible to more stringent regulation.8 3 The regula-
tion would do no more than change the manner of presentation of prod-
uct advertising and would further a compelling governmental interest in
ending sex role stereotyping in the already closely regulated public
airwaves.'8 4 The governmental interest which would be advanced is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the restriction on
(1972); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
934 (1972).
180. National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers & Distrib. v. FCC, 516
F.2d 526, 540 (2d Cir. 1975). See also CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 109-10 (1973).
181. The fact that, under the terms of an FCC ruling, no speech is actually banned,
has persuaded several courts of the validity of an FCC regulation when examined in light
of the first amendment. See National Assn of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194,
208 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). In Yale Broadcasting
Co., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found no objection to an
FCC requirement that radio broadcasters know and judge the content of drug-oriented
music. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court
reasoned that the first amendment was not violated by a regulation which called for
nothing more than monitoring of programming and which did not prohibit any form of
musical expression.
182. In National Association of Independent Television Producers and Distributors
v. FCC, the court of appeals noted that the FCC has long maintained suggested
classifications of programming designed to help prospective licensees and those seeking
license renewal to recognize what kind of programming balance the FCC deems to be
most in the public interest. National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers &
Distrib. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 526, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1975). The court concluded that
programming guidelines of this type do not constitute censorship and do not deprive the
licensee of ultimate responsibility for programming content. For an example of these
categories see FCC Form 303, 52 F.C.C.2d 184 (1975).
183. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96
S. CL 1817, 1830-31 n.24 (1976).
184. See the discussion of public policy in text accompanying notes 129-46 supra.
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the alleged first amendment freedom of advertisers would be no greater
than should be allowed in furtherance of the public interest. 185
Since the goal of the proposed regulation is improved service of the
public interest, the public itself should participate in the regulatory
process. Although the FCC continues to be the prime arbiter of the
public interest, its nationwide jurisdiciton prevents it from monitoring
the advertising of every one of its television licensees. Even more
important, the commission's regulatory functions should, whenever pos-
sible, be carried out in response to public reaction.186 The commission
can lead the way by heeding public policy and creating a regulatory
mechanism to alleviate the problem of sex role stereotyping in television
advertising. Nevertheless, to avoid becoming a governmental censor of
advertising content, the commission should use this regulatory mecha-
nism only in response to a citizen complaint. Tying the regulation to
citizen participation would preserve the commission's role as agent of
the public and quite properly place a significant responsibility on the
public itself. As it has been observed:
[I]t is the public in individual communities throughout the length
and breadth of our country who must bear final responsibility for
the quality and adequacy of television service . ... Under our
system, the interests of the public are dominant . . . . Hence,
individual citizens and the communities they compose owe a duty
to themselves and their peers to take an active interest in the scope
and quality of the television service which stations and networks
provide and which, undoubtedly, has a vast impact on their lives
and the lives of their children . . . .[T]heir interest in television
programming is direct and their responsibilities important. They
are the owners of television-indeed, of all broadcasting.' 8 7
Framework for the Proposed Regulation
In light of the above discussion, it is suggested that a commission
regulation concerning sex role stereotyping in television product adver-
tising should work in the following way. A broadcast licensee would be
subject to license challenge on the ground that by failing to present a
fair and representative image of women in its advertising, it had neglect-
ed to serve the public interest. On petition by a citizen or bona fide
185. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
186. This view is in accord with stated FCC practice. The commission has
observed that "[als a matter of general procedure we do not monitor broadcasts for
possible violations, but act on the basis of complaints received from interested citizens."
Los Angeles Irish Coalition, 52 F.C.C.2d 681, 682 (1975).
187. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966), quoting H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1963). See
also Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 546,
549 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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community organization, 18 the commission would be required to exam-
ine the advertising logs of the licensee at license renewal time. 18 9  If,
after such evaluation, there remained a substantial and material question
of compliance with commission policy, then, pursuant to existing com-
mission procedure, an evidentiary hearing would be held on the merits
of the citizen petition. 190 To assist the commission in its determination,
each licensee would be required to keep in its advertising log a record of
the sex roles portrayed in product commercials broadcast over its sta-
tion. 191
188. Since the decision of now Chief Justice Burger in United Church of Christ,
any party representing a bona fide community public interest has had standing to
intervene in opposition to a broadcast license renewal without the need to show actual
economic injury. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In a later companion decision, the position of public
interest challengers to a license renewal was strengthened even further. Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In
the latter decision, then Circuit Judge Burger castigated the FCC for a "curious
neutrality-in-favor-of-the-licensee" and "hostility" toward the efforts of "Public Interven-
ors" to prove their case. Id. at 547, 549-50. The respect which Justice Burger
demanded the FCC pay to the public intervenor is an important element in the effective
implementation of the regulatory scheme proposed in this note: "We did not intend that
intervenors representing a public interest be treated as interlopers. Rather, if analogies
can be useful, a 'Public Intervenor' who is seeking no license or private right is, in
this context (of challenging a license renewal), more nearly like a complaining witness
who presents evidence to police or a prosecutor whose duty it is to conduct an af-
firmative and objective investigation of all the facts and to pursue his prosecutorial or
regulatory function if there is probable cause to believe a violation has occurred." Id.
at 546. See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1)-(2) (1970); 47 C.F.R. § 1.223, 1.225 (1974).
189. Each licensee has the duty, on request, to make station logs available for FCC
inspection. 47 C.F.R. § 1.6, 73.674 (1974).
190. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)-(e) (1970). Legislative history provides a definition of
the material question of fact which is required before an evidentiary hearing is to be held
under the statute: "[F]or the purposes of sections 309(d) and (e), a 'material question
of fact' is a question of fact which is material to determination of the question whether
the public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served by the granting of the
application with respect to which such question is raised." H. REP. No. 1800, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960); see Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 322-23 & n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
In the event that an evidentiary hearing is held, full procedural safeguards and
appeal rights are guaranteed to the broadcast licensee. 5 U.S.C. H8 551-59 (1970 &
Supp. IV, 1974); 47 U.S.C. H§ 401-16 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-.363
(1975); see United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202 (1956);
National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers and Distrib., 516 F.2d 526, 540 (2d
Cir. 1975).
191. The FCC has wide discretion to require whatever information it deems
necessary for proper consideration of a request for license renewal. See 47 U.S.C. §
308(b) (1970). The advertising record called for in this note could take the form of the
evaluation suggested by a 1974 survey which listed the following criteria for determining
the sexual bias of a television commercial: (1) sex of the potential market for the
product; (2) sex of announcer voice-over; (3) sexes of primary and secondary actors;
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The procedural details of this regulation would depend on how the
FCC chose to distribute the workload of administering complaints
received under the new rules. There is no question that the commission
already possesses a number of regulatory techniques which could easily
be adapted to the task of enforcing a rule governing sex role stereotyp-
ing in television product advertising. The commission's television busi-
ness is already handled under delegated authority by an administrative
bureau.'92 In addition, a panel of administrative law judges, 9 s a
review board, 94 and an office of opinions and review"15 would be
capable of conducting many of the interlocutory phases of an advertising
complaint which might occur prior to the commission's en banc consid-
eration of a petition to deny license renewal. 196 Rights of appeal are
guaranteed from all FCC subagency decisions to the full commission
and thence to the United States Courts of Appeals. 97
The standard to be used both by licensees in evaluating their
community responsibilities under the proposed regulation and by the
FCC in measuring compliance would be articulated in publicly distrib-
uted guidelines on sex role portrayal similar to those already adopted by
several private organizations for other types of media. A finding by the
FCC that a broadcaster had failed to make a good faith effort to satisfy
these guidelines' would subject that broadcaster to the full range of
(4) directive, i.e., response elicited, behavior encouraged; (5) sex of person who needed
help/person who gave help; (6) sex of person who gave advice/person who received
advice; (7) occupations of actors; (8) physical appearances of actors; (9) psychological
appearances of actors, i.e., happy, sad, frustrated, etc.; (10) roles of actors, i.e.,
dominant, subservient, etc. Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 4, at 71. Since many
television advertisements originate with network headquarters in New York, the licensees
may wish to encourage the network to provide a portion of this ongoing evaluation in
order to lessen the individual licensees' clerical burdens.
192. See 47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(1) (1970). Under delegated authority, the Broadcast
Bureau of the FCC not only handles intake of television matters, but also issues opinions
and makes recommendations to the full commission. 47 C.F.R. 99 0.71, 0.281 (1975).
With a set of guidelines governing sex role stereotyping in product advertising, this
bureau could easily do much of the work necessary to the commission's consideration of
a petition to deny license renewal under the proposed regulation. Note, however, that
broadcasters need not fear that their fate under the proposed regulation would be decided
by a subagency of the FCC. Although the Broadcast Bureau has considerable responsi-
bility under its delegated authority, it is required to refer to the commission en banc all
petitions to deny directed against television license renewal applicants. Id. § 0.281 (18)
(ii) (b) (1975).
193. See 47 C.F.R. §9 0.151, 0.351 (1974).
194. See id. § 0.161, 0.361.
195. See id. 99 0.171, 0.371.
196. En bane consideration of a petition to deny a license renewal is specified in id.
*§ 0.281(18)(ii)(b) (1975).
197. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.115 (1974); 47 U.S.C. 9H 155(d)(4), 402(b) (1970). See
note 190 supra.
198. See NATIONAL ADVERTISING REVIEW BoA, , ADVERTISING AND WOMEN (1975);
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FCC sanctions,199 to be imposed during the license renewal proceeding.
Conclusion
Because of its tremendous influence, television product advertising
is an important part of the television programming made available to the
American public. In light of the careful balancing of interests necessary
under the first amendment, it is submitted that when advertising runs
counter to public policy against sex role stereotyping, it can and should
be regulated by the FCC. For the commission to do less would be to
ignore the public interest as defined by public policy and thereby to
abdicate the FCC's fiduciary responsibility to the American people.
At the same time, it is not expected that adoption of the regulation
proposed in this note would result in a flood of broadcast license
revocations. The history of FCC license renewal proceedings "has
hardly been a history of arbitrary oppression."200 There is no reason to
suspect that under the proposed regulation a licensee would risk unjusti-
fied punishment for efforts made in good faith. Evaluating licensees by
the standards of good faith and reasonableness has become a firmly
established practice at the FCC and in the courts, and those standards
are unlikely to be shaken by any new advertising regulation.20 1 At the
same time the proposed regulation would serve to place licensees (and,
indirectly, television networks and advertisers) on notice that represent-
ing the needs of women in the community is an important component of
the public interest obligation which each licensee undertakes to fulfill.
Moreover, the possibility of license challenges and FCC sanctions for
Scott, Foresman & Co., Guidelines for Improving the Image of Women in Textbooks,
Sept. 1972; 'Man!': Memo from a Publisher, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1974, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 38.
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1) (a) (1970) (suspension of license for violation of
Communications Act or of commission rules and regulations); id. § 307(d) (denial or
limitation of license renewal by commission if public interest not adequately served); id.
§ 312(a)-(b) (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974) (authority for commission to revoke license for
willful or repeated failure to abide by terms of either license, Communications Act, or
rules and regulations of commission; authority for commission to issue final cease and
desist orders and to revoke licenses for violations of those orders); id. § 503(b) (1970)
(authority for commission to impose $1000 fine per violation for repeated failure to
observe conditions of broadcasting license provisions of Communications Act, commis-
sion rules and regulations, or commission cease and desist orders). See also Head v.
New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Rollo, Enforcement Provisions of the Communications Act, 18 FED. COMM.
BARJ. 45 (1963).
200. National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers and Distrib., 516 F.2d
526, 540 (2d Cir. 1975); accord, Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
201. See NBC v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Tamm, J.,
supporting order vacating earlier judgment); Neckritz v. FCC, 502 F.2d 411, 418 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
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breach of that obligation would effectively dissuade any licensee from
ignoring a new commission policy and regulations against sex role
stereotyping in product advertising.202
Aside from increasing the sensitivity of the broadcasting industry
to the needs of women, the proposed regulation would have the effect of
reasserting the commission's role as guardian of the public trust in the
airwaves. The need for FCC assertiveness is particularly great in the
case of television product advertising, since the corporate self-interest of
both the companies producing commercials and the television networks
seeking advertising revenue tends to allow whatever sells to be aired. As
one court of appeals observed in analyzing the public interest perspec-
tive of a television producer as compared to that of the FCC:
[N]o matter how dedicated they may be to the "public interest"
.[television producers] advocate what they think is essentially in
their own economic interest. It is the task of the Commission to
find, as best it can, what is in the "public interest" amid the con-
flicting advocacy of that "public interest" by its several protag-
onists. 203
It will be argued perhaps that this description is an ungenerous
characterization of the broadcasting industry and that broadcasters and
advertisers are in fact becoming increasingly responsive to the public
interest in the image of women as well as the public interest in a new
brand of toothpaste. If this argument is supportable, the regulation
proposed in this note would be unnecessary. In the absence of concrete
evidence that broadcasters or advertisers are addressing the problem of
sex role stereotyping in television product advertising, however, there is
no alternative but to call upon the FCC to act on behalf of the public's
interest in the use of the airwaves.2 °4
Equally important, the proposed regulation would tap the vast
potential of television for changing the image which people have of
women and which women have of themselves. In this regard, it has
been noted:
202. Requiring a licensee to present to the television audience views representative
of the community has been specifically accepted by the Supreme Court as being within
the power of the FCC. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389
(1969).
203. National Ass'n of Independent Television Producers and Distrib., 516 F.2d
526, 532 (2d Cir. 1975).
204. In fairness it should be noted that the National Association of Broadcasters
has issued a policy statement concerning the responsibility of both broadcasters and
advertisers to "be sensitive to the need for balance in the portrayals of men and women
in all aspects of society, both inside and outside the home." L.A. Times, Oct. 14, 1975,
§ 4, at 14, col. 1. It is hoped that such statements will contribute to an improvement of




[Tielevision constantly provides its perception of people with whom
viewers can identify on the basis of race, religion, social class, occu-
pation, interests, appearance, etc. The "self-fulfilling prophecy"
claims people will adopt a pattern of behavior because they per-
ceive it to be what others expect of them. Thus when television
assumes or attributes certain qualities in other people, it cannot
help but have an effect on what qualities viewers who identify with
these people will display.205
Thus, a failure to change the image of women in the media could
significantly affect the ability of women to break the mold fashioned for
them by pervasive stereotypes. As one theorist has stated: "rlhe
kind of feminine self-image which lowers aspiration and permits the
acceptance of a dependant status . . .must be countered directly by
changing the ideological messages which women receive . ... 201
Product advertisers will no doubt appreciate that achievement of
these goals need not hurt product sales. A gift of prophecy is not
needed to see that the roles of women in America are changing dramati-
cally. Reflecting that change in commercial television advertising
should therefore strike a responsive chord in millions of women who are
now alienated and offended by stereotypes in the media. One sociolo-
gist summarized this point in the following way:
Female persuasion is generally based upon affirmations of the ex-
cellence of female social roles, including those that are traditionally
feminine. . as well as those that affirm the equality or superi-
ority of females to males in both psychological and biological mat-
ters. Because . . . feelings of female equality, excellence and
dominance are ... needed by [women], communications that af-
firm variations of both themes at the same time usually offer con-
siderable potential for effective persuasion .... 207
Admittedly, the path charted for the FCC in this note is something
of a tightrope. As one court has observed:
In seeking to provide the broadcasting media with the diversity de-
manded by the first amendment. . . the Commission must avoid
the perils of both inaction and overzealousness-of abdication
which would allow those possessing the most economic power to
dictate what may be heard, and of censorship which would allow
the government to control the ideas communicated to the public.
The need to make choices of this kind requires the Commission
to take some cognizance of the kind and content of programs being
offered to the public.208
205. Silverstein & Silverstein, supra note 4, at 74.
206. Butler-Paisley & Paisley-Butler, supra note 10 pt. 1, at 7, quoting Helen Mayer
Hacker, Women as a Minority Group: Twenty Years Later 7 (1972) (address delivered
to the American Psychological Association Convention in Honolulu).
207. G. GORDON, PERSUASION: THE THEORY AND PRACICE OF MANIPULATVE CoM-
MUNICATION 402-03 (1971).
208. National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 207 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970); accord, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
September 1976]
Despite 'the difficulty involved in regulation, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission has no choice, given a national policy of commitment
to ending sex discrimination, but to take the limited steps outlined in
this note in order to enforce a public interest obligation in the area of
sex role stereotyping in television product advertising. By requiring a
balanced image of women, the FCC will neither subject licensees to
censorship nor dictate the content of programs. On the contrary,
through this regulation the commission will further the goal expressed
by the Supreme Court of insuring that the listening and viewing public
is exposed to a wide variety of "social, political, esthetic, moral and
other ideas and experiences."20 9
David M. Axelrad*
412 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1973); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842
(1969).
209. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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